The Gettier Problem

It would take far too much space to explain the Gettier Problem, so I leave it to the reader to familiarize himself with the issue at hand. Wikipedia has a very clear and concise description of the problem and I highly recommend it. Gettier's original article is short and easy to understand. I recommend it as well. Most people who would read this post and respond know the problem anyway, so a detailed explanation is unnecessary.

Gettier Case 1: Smith is making three claims to knowlege here, not just one. His primary claim to knowledge stands wholly dependent on two others. His justification for claiming that "the man who gets the job will have 10 coins in his pocket" is that he knows (by the definition justified true belief) that "Jones is the man who will get the job" and that "Jones has 10 coins in his pocket." In order for him to know these two propositions, they must be justified, believed, and true. One of these propositions, however, is in fact not true, so Smith was not within his epistemic rights to claim that he knew it. Consider his argument:

(1) Jones is the man who will get the job.
(2) Jones has 10 coins in his pocket.
(3) The man who gets the job will have 10 coins in his pocket.

It should be obvious that the argument is valid, but it is not sound. Premise 1 is not true, and therefore not knowledge. Knowledge, like truth, propogates through the argument to the conclusion. Smith is making three claims to knowledge in this case. His knowledge of (3) is dependent on his knowledge of (1) and (2). In fact, the heart of Smith's justification for (3) is his knowledge of (1) and (2). In other words, Smith's justification for (3) was poor. If he does not know (1) and (2), then he is not justified in claiming to know (3). Smith's claim to knowledge fails, not because justified true belief is inadequate, but because premise (1) did not meet the criteria for knowledge (it was not true), and therefore served as a poor justification for believing (3).

Gettier Case 2: Like Case 1, Gettier sort of "glosses over" the fact that Smith is making multiple claims to knowlege, some of which depend on others. The first claim is (f), “Jones owns a Ford.” In order for Smith to claim knowledge of (f) under the definition in question, (f) needs to be a) justified, b) believed, and c) true. Smith is justified in believing that Jones owns a Ford and he does in fact believe that Jones owns a Ford, but it is not true that Jones owns a Ford. It is true that (f) entails (g), (h), and (i), but given that Smith cannot claim (f) as knowledge, he is not within his epistemic rights to claim as knowledge any of those propositions entailed by (f). All that Gettier has succeded in showing here is that knowledge carries through the entailment. If Smith knows that “Jones owns a Ford,” then by entailment, Smith knows that “either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona.” The same applies to the Barcelona clause. In order for Smith to know the disjunctive proposition, he must know one or both of the corresponding clauses. Once again, Smith's claim to knowledge fails, not because justified true belief is inadequate, but because (f) did not meet the criteria for knowledge (it was not true), and therefore served as a poor justification for believing (h).